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Even Less: Antinomies and Aesthetic Anorexia in the
Magnetic Fields’ 69 Love Songs (An Album for Boys
and Girls) 1
A. Kiarina Kordela
Macalester College
Even less
a little glimpse of nothingness
sucking meaning from the
rest of this mess
The Magnetic Fields 2
In anorexia nervosa, what the child eats is the nothing.
Jacques Lacan 3
This paper is motivated by a paradox in the reception of the Magnetic Fields’
three-volume album, 69 Love Songs. 4 In a class in which we discussed this
album, a group of students maintained that this is a great collection of songs
to listen to after the break-up of an amorous relation because it entirely
deconstructs love and shows its absurdity. Another group of students
emphatically disagreed, arguing that it would be too painful to listen to these
songs because their overall assertion is that one can find happiness only in
the plenitude of love. Do the 69 Love Songs deconstruct or reaffirm love?

1

The question seems to have already bothered others. In the year of the
album's release, Rob Tannenbaum reports, with postmodern impartiality:
'Merritt and three other singers celebrate or condemn romance in its myriad
guises, from boy-girl to less common permutations, bending gender roles
with cantankerous glee.' I do not think, however, that either our class's
exclusive disjunction (either a celebration or a condemnation of love) or
Tannenbaum's inclusive pluralism (some songs celebrate and others
condemn) justify his conclusion that 'even reasonably smart audiences don't
know what to make of Merritt and his music.' 5

2

The Dynamic Songs
An inexorable tension between impossibility and necessity seems to
stigmatise love throughout the 69 Love Songs. Already the very first line of
the three-volume concept-album warns: 'Don't fall in love with me yet.' You
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are initially misled to hear in this imperative the exigencies of a matured
caution against haste: 'We only recently met.' But the song continues: 'True
I'm in love with you', yet for all that, 'you might decide I'm nut', and if you
'give me a week or two to / go absolutely cuckoo', then you will 'see your
error' and 'flee in terror / like everybody else does.' The amorous affair is
introduced as doomed to fail in the progress of time. A fortiori, you must not
fall in love with me precisely because the affair must fail, for 'I'm easy to get
rid of / but not if you fall in love', in which case you are likely not to flee away.
'If you make' this 'mistake' of falling in love with me, 'my heart will certainly
break' and 'I'll have to jump in a lake', but if you do not fall in love with me,
'like everybody else does', I (and you) can perpetuate the recurrence of the
failure of the love affair ('Absolutely Cuckoo', vol. 1). And in doing so, we
reconfirm love's absolute power. For if I implore you not to fall in love with
me it's not because love does not have a grip on me, but, quite the contrary,
because love has the power of making me 'jump in a lake.' Love triumphs as
absolute and omnipotent transcendental necessity only as long as the
empirical amorous affair is doomed to fail.
This split between transcendental concept—Love as necessary and
invincible Law or Force—and empirical amorous affair—the experience of
invariably failed love affairs in the subject's history—constitutes a prominent
epistemological leitmotif in the 69 Love Songs, determining those songs
which I call, for reasons that will become clear below, the dynamic set of
songs.

4

In this set, 'I could make you fly away / but I could never make you stay' ('All
My Little Words', vol. 1). The Law of Love can be upheld only through the
empirical loss of the beloved—'I don't want to get over you / cause I don't
want to get over love' ('I Don't Want To Get Over You', vol. 1)—or, what
amounts to the same, through unrequited love—'love you, obviously, /like
you really care' ('How Fucking Romantic', vol. 1); 'I made you mine, or so it
seemed… /You never will love me at all… / You're dreaming of / the corpse
you really love' ('The One You Really Love', vol. 1). Not excluded from this
empirical pain is the merciless cruelty break-ups or divorces may involve, as
in the arguably exemplary dynamic song, 'Yeah! Oh, Yeah!' (vol. 3). One
way or another, 'my only love has' always 'gone away', 'my heart' is 'gone',
and 'life goes on' only as my 'death goes on' ('My Only Friend' and 'Epitaph
for My Heart', vol. 2). Like a zombie, 'bitter tears keep me going / through the
years', until 'all the world', including 'moon', 'stars', and 'the dead in their
graves / and the gods in their caves' are 'singing the blues' ('Bitter Tears' and
'Blue You', vol. 3). In the dynamic songs, the truly inseparable lovers seem
to be love and death themselves, their amorous affair alone being both
necessary and possible.
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Conversely, just as the empirical impossibility of the affair guarantees the
transcendental Law of Love, the necessity of Love guarantees the law of the
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impossibility of the affair. This is the relation between transcendence and
experience, the sole characters in the dynamic set of songs whose love is
both necessary and possible. The theme is old but far from exhausted. What
is the effect of coupling not human lovers but love and death, as the standins for transcendence and experience, in the only embrace that can endure?
I suggest that we can approach this question by following a SpinozianKantian-Lacanian line of thought. 6
The Magnetic Fields, or at least Stephin Merritt, who, in his own words,
'thought of the idea' of the 69 Love Songs, shared the fundamental concern
underlying Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Merritt wrote not just one or even
'40 love songs', which 'would be silly', but 'Sixty-nine', which, beyond its
'obvious relation to romance' and 'graphic possibilities', is 'grandiose'; it was
in fact only because of practical reasons that he did not write '100', as they
'would be 200 minutes long which is hours and hours'. 7 Whether one sets
out to make 100 or 69 love songs, the intention obviously is not to speak
about one historically contingent case of a love affair, but to make a
comprehensive statement about love, to approach love universally and as a
totality. This intention is reconfirmed also by the musical ambitions of the
album which undertakes an indefatigable journey in the history of music that
passes through, and often combines within an individual song, periods,
genres and styles, such as: a cappella, blues, jazz, 1960s beat jazz poetry,
jazzy Lieder and bebop, bubble-gum pop, choral pop, summery pop and
sentimental pop, old cowboy ballads, rock ’n’ roll ballads, rock ballads and
1980s pop ballads, slow dance (e.g., in the Phil Collins tradition), Irish folky
tunes, cosmic background, space rock, drone music and shoegaze, dirges,
piano-bar solo songs, epic show tunes (Broadway or Tom Jones type),
Africa, Caribbean music, cheer songs, hippy protest songs, disco, new
wave, country, serenades, apocalyptic music, punk, balalaika songs, postWWII chansons, duets, lullabies and children songs, carnival or circus
music, blue grass, waltz and sentimental melodies—a list that is far from
exhaustive—as well as playing styles that range from acoustic to 1970s
strumming guitar and everything in-between or thereafter. 8 On the musical
level, too, the 69 Love Songs aspire to reach the limits of experience and
cover its totality, in this case, the totality of the history of twentieth-century
Western music, which, of course, has in itself already incorporated and
appropriated to its own ends a long musical tradition since the Middle Ages
and the Renaissance, as well as non Western music, notably in this case
African. In short, in the enterprise of the 69 Love Songs, Merritt and his
collaborators shared the same ambition as Immanuel Kant, whose
'transcendental critique' aimed at nothing less than approaching a subject—
in his case, the world or all possible experience—as a totality. The album
literally belongs to the 'transcendental', not the 'dumb', part of 'The Book of
Love' (vol. 1).

7

But, as Kant admonishes us, the first obstacle in speaking of 'absolute
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totality', be it that 'of all possible experience' or of all possible love
experience, lies in the fact that 'absolute totality […] is itself not experience'
but a 'transcendent' thing, a pure concept of reason, and not something that
one can actually experience. 9 I may be able to entertain in the abstract the
concept of all possible configurations of love, but I cannot actually
experience them. But even the abstract contemplation stumbles against
obstacles. For the second impediment emerges from reason's failure to
constitute the 'totality' of 'all possible experience', of 'love', or what have you.
To explicate this point, Kant offers the following example of what he calls the
dynamic antinomy of pure reason. Regarding the cause of everything in the
world, reason can prove two contradictory statements as true: the thesis that
beyond the 'laws of nature […] there is also […] freedom', and the antithesis
that 'there is no freedom' but only 'laws of nature.' 10 After extensively proving
as true both freedom and determinism, Kant proceeds to argue that reason
nevertheless does not fall into an antinomy here, for 'if natural necessity is
merely referred to appearances'—the realm of experience—'and freedom
merely to things in themselves'—the realm of transcendence—then, 'no
contradiction arises if we […] admit both kinds of causality […] to one and
the very same thing, but in different relations—on one side as an
appearance, on the other as a thing-in-itself.' 11 Reason does not fall into an
antinomy as long as the exception of the transcendent free thing-in-itself
guarantees the subjection of the totality of experience to the law, and vice
versa. In other words, in the case of the dynamic antinomy, reason manages
to form a whole or a totality (deterministic experience), but only by positing
an exception (free thing-in-itself) to that totality.
Cast in terms more directly relevant to 69 Love Songs, 'one and the very
same thing', human action, can 'on one side as an appearance' within
empirical reality be determined by the law of a repetition compulsion to fail in
the amorous endeavour, while, 'on the other [side] as a thing-in-itself', in the
realm of transcendence, it can be free of this law and instead be caused
purely by the Force of Love. While love is the transcendental cause of
human action, in their empirical reality humans are governed by the
compulsion to fail in their love affairs. The empirical law of the repetitive
amorous failure is sustained by the transcendental Law of Love as the
ultimate cause of human action, and, conversely, the compulsive repetition
of the amorous failure sustains Love as the transcendental Law of human
action. Reason fails in this set of songs in 69 Love Songs in the mode of the
dynamic antinomy—hence the set's name.

9

And in failing in this way, these songs grasp the relation between the two 10
cardinal causes of human action, as conceived in Freudian/Lacanian
psychoanalysis: the pleasure principle and the death drive (the latter being
another word for repetition compulsion). 12 As Deleuze has succinctly
clarified, contrary to a common misunderstanding, the death drive is not the
exception to the pleasure principle, but its transcendental precondition:

What we call a principle or law is […] that which governs a particular
field; it is in this sense that we speak of an empirical principle or a law.
Thus we say that the pleasure principle governs life universally
without exception. But […] there must be a principle of another kind, a
second-order principle, which accounts for the necessary compliance
of the field with the empirical principle. It is this second-order principle
[the death drive] that we call transcendental. 13
While subjects are empirically (consciously) motivated to act by their search
for pleasure, it is another, second-order or transcendental (unconscious)
principle, the death drive, that determines their actions to be governed by the
pleasure principle.
The ingenuity of the universe of the dynamic set of the 69 Love Songs lies, 11
however, in an apparent inversion regarding the domains of the death drive
and the pleasure principle, according to which the latter governs
transcendence while empirical life is dominated by the death drive: if affairs
fail empirically it is because they succumb to the death drive so that Love
and its pleasures can triumph transcendentally.
Although fully aware of the invincible Force and bliss of love, the 'characters' 12
of the songs do not ever let themselves experience it, for the unshakable
belief in the dynamic songs is that love’s joy is empirically impossible, a
hypothesis of an always unrealisable possibility. These songs advance,
therefore, the properly psychoanalytic thesis that the unconscious—the Real
of one's desire—is on the side of knowledge, not on that of belief. As Slavoj
Žižek writes regarding the question, 'where…does the desire reside':
'contrary to the obvious answer (in the belief—'I know that X will take place,
but I refuse to believe it since it runs against my desire…'), the Lacanian
answer […] is […]: in the knowledge.' To exemplify his point, Žižek turns to a
filmic example, Arbogast's murder in Alfred Hitchcock's Psycho (1960). In
Žižek's words:
the greatest surprise is caused by the complete fulfillment of our
expectations…'I know very well that X will take place (that Arbogast
will be murdered), yet I do not fully believe it (so I'm none the less
surprised when the murder actually takes place).'…as viewers of
Psycho, we desire the death of Arbogast, and the function of our
belief that Arbogast will not be attacked by the 'mother'-figure is
precisely to enable us to avoid the confrontation with the Real of our
desire. 14
What we know and desire—the Real of our desire—is Arbogast's murder;
yet our defence against confronting the Real of our desire, the mechanism
through which we repress this desire so that we are not conscious of it, is

enabled by our conscious belief that Arbogast will not be attacked, and, at
the end, we are surprised by seeing fulfilled what we always already have
unconsciously known.
By the same token, the 'horrifying reality' that the dynamic songs refuse to 13
'believe in' and to 'integrate into [their] symbolic universe' (to sing) is the
triumph of love within the realm of experience, the fact that the empirical
amorous affair could be successful, as it used to be represented, say, in just
about every romantic Hollywood film in the 1950s. The postmodern postulate
regarding love manifests itself here as the inversion of the standard classical
happy ending, whereby the logic becomes: 'I know very well [on a
transcendental level] that my love affair will fail, yet [empirically or practically]
I do not fully believe it, so that, on the one hand, I act as if it would not fail
(i.e., I do engage in love affairs), and, on the other, I am taken by surprise
when it actually fails.' Except that now this well-known modernist fetishistic
logic is adulterated by the further postmodern knowledge that 'You and me,
we don't believe /in happy endings'—i.e., a second-order belief beyond the
one (in the happy ending or the non-failure of the affair) allowing us to
defend ourselves against our knowledge (that it will fail), and which (secondorder or transcendental belief) thus overlaps entirely with our
(transcendental) knowledge (that the affair will fail) ('My Only Friend', vol. 2).
There is no longer a distance or discrepancy between knowledge and belief.
Which is why postmodern subjectivity enters the love affair, and this without
the remotest sense of guilt, not with unmitigated passion but with calculating
caution. 15
The dynamic songs are an artistic representation of the formal matrix 14
underlying the postmodern configuration of knowledge and belief regarding
love. By sustaining Love as a transcendental Necessity in the midst of
postmodern discourse, these songs reveal that love is the repressed Real of
the desire underlying its cynicism, camp and the generalised biopolitical
demand to treat romance, love and sexuality as a trine of quasi-professional
partnership, a health issue and an athletic activity. 16
This insight entails that the 69 Love Songs perform a kind of social criticism. 15
Yet we have to specify both the object and the method or strategy of this
criticism. To do so, I am now turning for a comparison to a moment in
modernist social criticism, and specifically the work of the Neo-Realist film
director Michelangelo Antonioni. Like the dynamic songs, Antonioni’s films,
as Deleuze argues, 'are inseparable from an objective critique', but, as we
shall presently see, the former are so in an intrinsically postmodern way. 17
Gilles Deleuze describes Antonioni's 'aesthetic vision' as follows:
[W]e are sick with Eros, because Eros is himself objectively sick: what
has love become that a man or a woman should emerge from it so
disabled, pitiful and suffering, and act and react as badly at the

beginning as at the end, in a corrupt society? 18
If in Antonioni the distinction between a sick Eros and a 'corrupt society' is
rigorously maintained, in the dynamic songs the societal corruption is
already biopolitically integrated in the man or the woman, so that the
distance between society and individual voice is evanescent, and words,
speaker and addressee are always already ethically corrupted: 'and who
said a man was fair'? ('Sweet-Lovin' Man', vol. 1). Betrayal is taken for
granted: 'When you betray me /betray me with a kiss' ('Come Back from San
Francisco', vol. 1). Words lie bilaterally: 'You've lied too/but it's a sin that I /
can't tell the truth' ('I Think I Need a New Heart', vol. 1). If something
momentarily seems to point to a hope beyond this generalised turpitude and
vice, this is singing itself: 'all comes out wrong/unless I put it in a song' (I
Think I Need a New Heart', vol. 1). Yet, songs and music, too, could not ever
prevent the failure of the amorous relation: 'but I could never make you stay /
not for all the tea in China /not if I could sing like a bird […] / not if I could
write for you / the sweetest song you ever heard' ('All My Little Words', vol.
1). At most, they can have a higher understanding of the lover—as with the
'acoustic guitar', which seems to 'understand where she's coming from /
which I obviously don't / or she wouldn't be gone' ('Acoustic Guitar, vol. 3)—
or a cathartic power, albeit not cleansed from vengeance: 'but my
sentimental melody / like a long-lost lullaby / will ring in your ears / down
through the years / bringing a tear to your eye' ('My Sentimental Melody', vol.
1). But, all in all, songs too cannot escape the universal law of dubiousness
and deception: 'it's all just a song / just beautiful lies' ('My Sentimental
Melody', vol. 1).
If Antonioni's modernist film, L'eclisse (The Eclipse, 1962) pointedly links the 16
objective sickness of Eros to the demands of the capitalist economy on the
characters, the 69 Love Songs shunt any attempt to distinguish between the
so-called individual and politico-economic realms. Rather, their critical
practice is governed by the consciousness that an effective postmodern
political criticism must bypass the traditional distinctions between the various
discourses on ethics, economics, politics, society and the individual, and
address all of them as a biopolitical assemblage. Indicative of this approach
is Merritt's self-representation, whose biopolitical resistance frustrates the
expectations of and norms imposed on indie-rock and mainstream, alike. For
instance, despite having grown up in relative poverty, Merritt poses as a
'spoiled rich kid' and, thumbing his nose at identity politics and political
correctness, refuses to flaunt homosexuality, to champion hip-hop and even
to identify with the 'indie-ghetto', generally withdrawing from the privilege of
representing the subaltern periphery (Merritt in 'As Hundreds Cheer' and
liner). And, while these are gestures that some would welcome (even if for
different reasons than Merritt's), people in the USA, unlike the 'English',
'again and again' feel that 'Merritt hates them', for he also infringes on more
universalisable postmodern biopolitical injunctions of the USA, including

political correctness (the main focus of The New Yorker's Sasha Frere-Jones
and Chicago Reader's Jessica Hopper), anti-intellectualism, sloppiness of
expression, idle talk, polite hypocrisy, systematic engagement in social and
sexual intercourse, cheerfulness and even a higher pitch of voice than he
actually has. 19 In the U.S.A., Merritt's biopolitical rebellion may render him
an outsider to both 'centre' and 'margin', yet, though the life of the artist is
inseparable from his work, an ad hominem argument does not suffice. More
crucial to my argument is the resistance inscribed in the songs.
Of the sixty-nine songs, only 'I Don't Want to Get Over You' (vol. 1) explicitly 17
resists current biopolitical trends, with the narrator's refusal to take 'Prozac',
'listen to my therapist', 'pretend you don't exist', and 'smile all night / at
somebody new.' The remaining songs often adopt the biopolitical demands
of postmodernity as, if you wish, 'uncritically' integrated parts of the lover's
discourse—e.g., 'kiss me, I've quit smoking' ('Come Back From San
Francisco', vol. 1). Metaphors marrying the lover's discourse with the
scientific foreground the dominant technologisation and scientification of
emotions in contemporary biopolitics by replicating its discourse: 'It's making
me blue / Pantone 292 / Reno Dakota I'm reaching my quota / of tears for
the year' ('Reno Dakota', vol. 1), or passim in 'Wi' Nae Wee Bairn Ye'll Me
Beget' and 'Experimental Music Love' (vol. 3), not to mention the 'Epitaph for
My Heart' (vol. 2):
Caution: to prevent electric shock
do not remove cover
No user-serviceable parts inside
Refer servicing to qualified
service personnel
Moreover, with its prevalent concatenation of love and suffering, on the one
hand—'If you don't cry / it isn't love' ('If you Don't Cry', vol. 2)—and
emotionless sexuality with a joyful nonchalance, on the other—'A Chicken
With Its Head Cut Off' (vol. 1), 'Let's Pretend We're Bunny Rabbits' (vol. 1),
'Underwear' (vol. 3)—the album reinforces the dominant biopolitical
pathologisation, if not incrimination, of romantic notions of love—'It's a crime
to fall in love / heart and mind and soul in love / It's a crime to fall in love so
hard / so hard' ('It’s a Crime', vol. 3). Beyond the absence of any distance
from the discursive tropes of postmodernity, the text of this compilation of
songs is quintessentially postmodern also in the sense that it covers aspects
of love and uses vocabulary that in the past would not be represented in a
love song (eminent examples being 'How Fucking Romantic' and 'Punk
Love' in vol. 1, or, again, 'Underwear' and 'Yeah! Oh, Yeah!' in vol. 3). And
last, but not least, these songs are marked by sarcasm. A fortiori, for Merritt
a song is 'a love song if it's sarcastic', and 'in the context of 69 Love Songs,
it's automatically sarcastic.' Unlike any other expressive mode, sarcasm
alone seems to have the prerogative of singing love in postmodernity.

Sarcasm, however, is the turning point in the 69 Love Songs' Moebius band, 18
at which, having followed all along this distinctly postmodern path, we are
surreptitiously led to the centre of modernism. As Fredric Jameson has
pointed out, among the symptoms of the cultural shift from modernism to
postmodernism is the replacement of all forms of parody, whose function is
by definition ironic and even sarcastic (and hence critical), with what
Theodor Adorno, in his work on Schoenberg, had called the pastiche. In
Jameson’s words, in postmodernism,
parody finds itself without a vocation […] Pastiche is like parody, the
imitation of a peculiar or unique, idiosyncratic style, the wearing of a
linguistic mask, speech in a dead language. But it is a neutral
pastiche of such mimicry, without any of parody’s ulterior motives,
amputated of the satiric impulse, devoid of laughter and of any
conviction that alongside the abnormal tongue you have momentarily
borrowed, some healthy linguistic normality still exists. 20
To refer to an at once pioneering and quintessential example of postmodern
pastiche in film production, think of Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982),
which cites a large array of filmic genres and periods, from hard-boiled film
noir and Orson Welles to Hong Kong action film and post-futurist science
fiction, without thereby indicating either that any of these styles is more
proper than the others or that some other style, not represented in the film,
would be the proper one. Judging on the album’s wild variety of musical
styles, referred to above, the 69 Love Songs could also be heard as a
musical pastiche—except for their irony or sarcasm. For one thing, none of
these sixty-nine tunes is performed 'straight' or 'seriously.' The Irish folk
borders on shoegaze, the piano-bar solo songs are decelerated to the point
of dozing, not unlike the epic show music whose additional minimalism
leaves only an emaciated skeleton of grandiosity haunt us; or, pushing
parody to its limits, minimalism is brought to coincide with repetitive, barely
'musical', excess, as in the 'Experimental Music Love' (vol. 3); plucking the
fiddle is executed with the virtuosity of plucking a chicken; traditional highbrow instruments are electronically manipulated to hilarious or pompous
distortion; solemn voices are accompanied by droll sounds and made to
sound automated … and the list goes on. (The same, sarcastic, distance is
also suffused throughout the album by Merritt’s off-key voice.) The musical
cornucopia of the album combined with the ingenious and irreverent
simplicity with which each individual song echoes its chosen genre(s) cannot
fail but advance the thesis that: at this point of history, not a single one of
these styles is worth replicating, yet, knowing them and being able to
replicate them by distorting them—that’s the beginning of wisdom. In other
words, far from engaging in pastiche, the 69 Love Songs execute a laborious
(at once appreciative and critical) parody of a long musical tradition, to single
out respectful knowledge and impious defiance in the face of tradition as

'some healthy linguistic normality.'
But if this may appear as just an aesthetic point, The Magnetic Fields’ 19
(ironic) criticism extends beyond to address and encompass the ethical
level. If, as Daniel Handler argues, in Merritt's songs 'usually […] the narrator
is […] sad or mourning the loss of innocence', it is precisely because she or
he 'is still innocent', still capable of love, even as she lives in and speaks this
'spoiled' world and language. For if she were not, she would lack the critical
distance required to experience her own and the world's absence of
innocence as a loss—non-innocence would be the sole conceivable state of
being. In spite of the narrators' empirical corruption, their transcendental
innocent gaze introduces a critical distance between enunciation and
statement, so that the sarcasm inhering in their 'spoiled' language turns
against itself. Innocence and love reappropriate postmodern sarcasm
against its own language and biopolitical rules. Unlike in Neo-Realism,
where there is a distance between individual and society (language), here
there is a fissure within the individual, between his statements (language)
and the position from or gaze under which they are enunciated.
The critical strategy of the dynamic songs is a postmodern reappropriation of 20
modernist sarcasm, which, by capitalising on love as the exemplary
discourse through which every aspect of society can be, and is, spoken,
exercises socio-political criticism directly on the biopolitical level. In the era
of universalised exchange value and the catholic commodification and
substitutionability of all objects, including love objects, nothing may be a
stronger point of socio-political critique than the resistance to allowing
oneself and others to become exchangeable objects, enabled by an irony
and even a sarcasm that, through the back door, introduces a gaze of
uniqueness and irreplaceability. It is possible that in the era of the quasiecumenical commodification of love and sexuality, nothing could have more
critical power other than the romantic concept of irrevocable love, whose
encomium is surreptitiously sung by ostensibly cynical lyrics—'only a gun /
could stop these bitter tears' ('Bitter Tears', vol. 3). In postmodernism, the
'solution' may indeed shackle together 'love, music, wine and revolution'
('World Love', vol. 2).
However, a caveat is required here due to a certain dominant tendency 21
within the tradition of modern Western philosophy. The dynamic songs'
biopolitical critique is predicated on the conceptual distinction between
experience and transcendence, but the relation between the two can be
conceived either in a dualist or in a monist way. The dualist understanding of
transcendence severs it from empirical experience, as is the case in
Descartes' division between body and soul, with the latter being immortal. 21
The monist conception of transcendence places the latter within the same
plane of immanence as empirical life, so that there can be no soul without
body, as Spinoza argued in his refutation of the soul's immortality. 22 This

division of Western thought continues to perpetuate itself today, as is evident
in the distinction between ego-psychology—for which the death drive is
inconsequential to empirical life which is governed exclusively by the
pleasure principle—and (Lacanian) psychoanalysis—for which the death
drive, albeit the transcendental precondition of the pleasure principle, is
operative within the immanence of empirical life. 23 If love is upheld in the 69
Love Songs as a transcendental function in the dualistic sense, then the
thrust of their social criticism would be pre-empted, as this love would be
expelled from the immanence of experience, as inconsequential to empirical
life. It would be an Ideal incapable of entering reality, whether out of one's
fear of it (the neurotic approach) or because of one's dismissal of it as
idealism (the cynical approach)—assuming that there is a real difference
between the two.
Indeed, at least according to one interpretation, the dynamic antinomy 22
shares the dualistic conception of transcendence, as becomes particularly
evident in Kant’s application of the dynamic antinomy to his political
philosophy. In his notorious article, 'What is Enlightenment?', Kant argued
that unconditional obedience should be expected from the 'citizen of civil
society', while 'freedom' should be reserved only for 'scholars' as 'world
citizens'. For, in this way, no contradiction arises if the imperative, 'Argue as
much as you will, and about what you will, but obey!', is addressed to the
very same subjects, but in different relations—on one side, as 'members of
the community [who] must passively conduct themselves with an artificial
unanimity', where 'argument is certainly not allowed—one must obey', and,
on the other side, 'as a member of the whole community or of a society of
world citizens', where the scholar 'certainly can argue without hurting the
affairs for which he is in part responsible as a passive member.' 24 Kant's
conception of enlightened civil society in the fashion of the dynamic
antinomy precludes any interaction between empirical civil society and
transcendental universe of world-citizens, rendering the freedom of the latter
realm inconsequential to the rigidity of the realm of unconditional obedience.
The formula of this society is: 'everyone is subject to the law, under the
precondition that only in a different aspect (as a "scholar"), everyone is not
subject to the law'. The political stakes of this logical hat trick are amply
evident in Frederic II's jubilant response—'Let them reason all they want to
as long as they obey.' 25 As Hannah Arendt has put it, political freedom in
Kant is in the last analysis reserved only for the 'spectator', the scholar
capable of assuming the 'general standpoint' of 'impartiality', which takes
'others into account' but knows nothing of 'how to combine with them in order
to act.' 26 Similarly, a dualistic conception of love would reduce it to an object
of speculation for the 'spectator', the 'scholar' or the listener who would know
nothing of how to engage with the other in an act of love.
To approach the monistic understanding of transcendence, let us return 23
once again to the Neo-Spinozist philosopher Deleuze. If we call, with

Deleuze, the entirety of time the 'crystal-image' its manifest present aspect
the 'actual image' and its presupposed past aspect the 'virtual image', then
the relation between present and past reveals itself as follows: 'The present
is the actual image, and its contemporaneous past is the virtual image, the
image in a mirror.' 27 In the crystal-image, 'each side', the actual and the
virtual, takes 'the other's role in a relation which we must describe as
reciprocal presupposition, or reversibility', whereby the past is the
transcendental precondition of the present, and vice versa. 28 Thus, although
past and present are 'distinct', they are 'indiscernible', so that 'the actual and
the virtual […] are in continual exchange.' 29 Here, actual and virtual, or
empirical and transcendental, are 'contemporaneous' and homogeneous,
that is, of the same ontological status, so that the one can take the place of
the other, and their roles exchange. This monistic conception of
transcendence is presupposed so that transcendental love can be realised
empirically (as well as so that the 69 Love Songs can, as they do, also
include songs in which the characters revel in the plenitude of their love).
What guarantees the monistic conception of transcendence in the 69 Love 24
Songs? For, as long as the dynamic antinomy allows for a dualist reading,
the dynamic songs cannot in themselves prevent an understanding of
transcendence as an exception that is required for the constitution of the
realm of obedience but remains external to it.
The Mathematic Songs
The dualistic conception of transcendence in the dynamic antinomy is also 25
presupposed in the Lacanian formulation of sexual difference, when read as
a rearticulation of the Kantian antinomies, as proposed by Joan Copjec. 30
Crucially, 'sex', both in Lacan and here, indicates neither gender difference
(a cultural construction) nor biological sex (whether a body has female or
male characteristics), let alone sexual orientation (whether one is
homosexual, heterosexual, etc.). Rather, sex indicates the failure of culture
(and, hence, representation, language, or the signifier) to represent the
human subject in its totality. The human subject is sexed (as opposed to
simply gendered) precisely because the signifier (reason) fails to represent
any totality, and hence also the totality of the subject. 31
Kant named the law governing the totality of civil society 'obedience.' In the 26
context of sexuality, Lacan calls the law governing the empirical totality of
the human subject the 'phallic function [ ]', and defines the male totality or
'man as whole' as the subject who 'acquires his inscription (prend son
inscription), with the proviso that this function [ ] is limited due to the
existence of an x by which the function x is negated (niée)', just as, in
Kant's dynamic antinomy qua civil society, there is an x (the 'scholar' or
'world citizen') by which obedience is negated. 32 The male sex is the effect
of reason’s failure in the mode of the dynamic antinomy.

If there were only one antinomy, the dynamic, there would be only one sex, 27
the male. But reason also fails in the mode of the mathematic antinomy.
Here, Kant's example concerns the limits of the world, regarding which
reason again offers two contradictory statements: the thesis that 'the world
has a beginning in time, and is…limited' in 'space'; and the antithesis that
'the world has no beginning, and no limits.' 33 However, these two statements
do not express truths about the world in itself, insofar as 'space and time,
together with the appearances in them' are 'nothing existing in themselves
and outside of my representations.' 34 Consequently, 'I cannot say the world
is infinite […] nor […] that it is finite' because in either case I would speak of
'my representations' of the world and not of the world in itself. 35
While this antinomy is incapable of producing true judgments about the 28
world, its thrust lies in alerting us to the fact that there may be a 'world' in
itself, a Real, beyond 'my representations.' In dualist fashion, the dynamic
antinomy treats the thing-in-itself as a transcendent exception (Ideal)
external to the empirical field (and representation), so that the latter forms a
closed totality within which everything is unconditionally subjected to the law.
By contrast, in a monist fashion, the mathematic antinomy allows the thingin-itself to pierce representation and force it to raise the question about its
existence, to which representation cannot respond anything that would
reduce the thing-in-itself to an external exception. Thus, representation
cannot form a closed totality, it remains not-whole, due to the thing-in-itself,
the 'real', which 'resists symbolisation absolutely', without nevertheless being
external to it. 36 The failure of reason in the mode of the mathematic
antinomy becomes in Lacan the matrix of the female sex which does 'not
allow for any universality', it remains 'not-whole, insofar as it has the choice
of positing itself in x or of not being there (de n'en pas être).' 37
It is through the mathematic or female songs that the 69 Love Songs raise 29
the question of the existence of the real—the real either is or is not—but
statements about it are neither true nor false, for these are categories that
pertain to judgments (representation), not to the real itself. A fortiori, the real
is what persistently subsists beyond claims about truth and falsity, which is
why it cannot be deconstructed. 38 Put differently, it is out of the failure of
representation to decide as to the truth or falsity of the limits of a totality that
the real emerges as an effect of an otherwise ecumenically deconstructive
representation.
Thus, for the female sex, the more the 69 Love Songs deconstruct love on 30
the level of representation, the more they reaffirm it on the level of the real.
This is the effect of the 69 Love Songs' contradictory celebration and
condemnation of love—an internal contradiction instrumental to the album's
epistemology, stated at its most explicit in 'The Death of Ferdinand de
Saussure' (vol. 3):

I met Ferdinand de Saussure
on a night like this
On love he said 'I'm not so sure
I even know what it is
No understanding, no closure
It is a nemesis
You can't use a bulldozer
to study orchids'
You can't use words to study love, is the lesson of the 'father' of structural
linguistics for The Magnetic Fields—yet it is only through this failure of the
words that love triumphs on the level of the real, as the song continues to
state: 'I do not know anything about love', yet 'I am nothing without love.' The
mathematic songs concur with Roland Barthes: 'What do I think of love?—As
a matter of fact, I think nothing of love. I'd be glad to know what it is, but
being inside, I see it in existence, not in essence.' 39
The mathematic songs, therefore, reveal the insurmountable gap between 31
representation or appearances and the real—a fissure, which as we shall
presently see, is necessary for the experience of love—but also the
difference between desire—an affair exclusively of appearances or
semblances—and love—something that emerges in the chasm between
appearance and the real. If, on the one hand, as Hegel already indicated,
and as Alexandre Kojève made explicit, '[d]esire is […] "humanizing," or
"anthropogenetic"’, love, on the other hand, is for the living mammal we call
anthropos that which, in Lacan’s words, 'humanizes jouissance [enjoyment]',
the latter being the subject’s affair with the real, that is, an impossible, and
unbearable, relation. 40 Expounding Lacan’s statement that only 'l’amoursublimation permet à la jouissance de condescendre au désir [lovesublimation allows jouissance to condescend to desire]', 41 Alenka Zupančič
writes 'the other that is accessible to desire is always the imaginary other',
the appearance or semblance of the other, 'whereas the Real (Other) of
desire remains unattainable', for:
The Real of desire is jouissance—that 'inhuman partner' (as Lacan
calls it) that desire aims at beyond its object, and that must remain
inaccessible. Love, on the other hand, is what somehow manages to
make the Real of desire accessible. This is what Lacan is aiming at
with his statement that love 'humanizes jouissance.' 42
If desire is too wrapped up in appearances to relate to the real of the other,
to the other as a real human being rather than one’s own imaginary
construction, and if jouissance is too 'inhuman' to treat the other as human,
as opposed to some inaccessible sublime object (Ideal), love is what allows
jouissance to condescend to desire, to 'make it possible for the Real to

condescend to the appearance (in the form of a split in the very core of
appearance)', whereby the Real does not turn out 'to be just another
appearance' but rather 'it is real precisely as appearance.' 43 It is only by
revealing the split between the inaccessible Real and appearance that the
mathematic antinomy provides access to love as the transgression of their
(apparent) opposition, thereby allowing us to experience the other as an
accessible and all-too-human ideal.
Aesthetic Anorexia
As the above line of thought indicates, the question of sex, just as the 32
question of the reality or not of love, cannot be answered within and in terms
of socio-cultural constructivism, as it pertains to the latter’s failure, which is
also to say its excess—'excess' being for Merritt the album’s only theme
beyond love. The mathematic songs point to excess most eloquently when
approaching love not as a particular life experience but explicitly as a
universal object that, as such, can be articulated around a universalising
simile or metaphor, as in 'The Book Of Love' (vol. 1) and 'Love Is Like A
Bottle of Gin' (vol. 3). Nobody cares to read the age-old, 'long and boring'
book of love, and, nevertheless, 'I love it when you read to me / and…you
can read me anything.' Although the enamoured subject can be described
through metaphors properly pertaining to inebriation, the central simile is not
reversible, with love's excess spilling over it: 'Love is like a bottle of gin / but
a bottle of gin is not like love.'
In 'Meaningless' (vol. 3)—the most explicit mathematic song, an exuberant 33
glorification of love qua real, beyond any possible representation or
meaning—'everything' pertaining to love is 'meaningless'; in fact, 'even less /
a little glimpse of nothingness.' The final fadeout, with its tireless sliding of
adverbs, is a conceptual crescendo reaffirming the subsistence of the real as
the register underlying all human experience, from the basic biological need
of nutrition to transcendence:
Nutrition
Sensation
Aesthetics
Reason/Extension
Finality
Reason/Totality
Sublimity
Credulity
History
Excitation
Faith
Transcendence

'deliciously meaningless'
'effervescently meaningless'
'beautifully meaningless'
'profoundly meaningless'
'definitively meaningless'
'comprehensively meaningless'
'magnificently meaningless'
'incredibly meaningless'
'unprecedentedly meaningless'
'Mind-blowingly meaningless'
'unbelievably meaningless'
'infinitely meaningless'

Although the adverbial syntagma, as Handler says, 'could have gone on […]
forever', it is no accident that it starts with nutrition and ends with a literally
excessive transcendence (insofar as the song fades out without ever
pronouncing it), particularly as this choice was not made consciously.
Merritt's intention was 'to make 26 lines and have them alphabetical', as was
actually the plan regarding all the songs of the album, which were 'originally'
intended 'to be sequenced alphabetically.' But Merritt 'abandoned that idea'
because 'it didn't work', just as he had to abandon the idea of the 26 lines in
the fadeout of 'Meaningless', mostly because of the difficulties the letter 'K'
posed in finding an adverb. So, neither the compilation of the songs in the
actual album nor the list of adverbs in this fadeout is the product of a plan.
Merritt provides no explanation of either the one or the other; they just
happened.
And yet, the link between nutrition and transcendence is both contingent and 34
necessary, which is also to say, real. If love is said to amount to 'even less /
a little glimpse of nothingness', it is because 'the nothing' is what the
anorectic eats. 44 For, 'at the oral level, ' the real 'from which the
subject…has separated itself off', in 'order to constitute itself' as a conscious
(i.e., representable) self, 'is the nothing, in so far as that from which the
subject was weaned', be it the breast or the bottle, 'is no longer anything for
him', since he can now eat by other means. Anorexia nervosa is the
symptom of the fact that the subject's 'lack'—the real of the subject's
desire—is nothing other than 'the nothing' itself, that is, that 'the nothing' or
'the real' is a positive function rather than just nothing. 45 Just as the
anorectic gives us a glimpse of the nothingness of lack, the lover gives us a
glimpse of the nothingness of love, and both point to the nothingness of the
real.
The epistemological and rhetorical strategies of the 69 Love Songs, which 35
elevate love to the level of the real via the defiles of monistic transcendence,
meaninglessness and nothingness, replicate the logic of anorexia on a
metaphorical level, in what could be called a practice of aesthetic anorexia.
Once one grasps the logic of aesthetic anorexia, the meaning of individual
mathematic songs, as was the case with 'Meaningless', is transformed and
made to point directly to the overall effect of the 69 Love Songs' aesthetic
mechanism. For instance, 'Nothing Matters When We're Dancing' (vol. 1),
does not simply point to the ambiguity that 'both nothing else matters when
we're dancing' and 'nothing matters at all when we're dancing', but now
makes the two sides of this double entendre, 'nothing else' and 'nothing at
all', converge so as to reveal love as the sole thing that matters when we're
dancing. 46 Love, as a monistic transcendence inseparable from experience,
cannot but infect and undermine the latter’s categories, time and space, so
that they somehow vanish, and it eventually does not matter whether we are
dancing in 'Paris or in Lansing' to the sound of 'dreadful tunes' and 'awful
songs', for 'we don't even hear.' This is the effect of aesthetic anorexia,

because of which we are not idealistically ecstatic, but extimate: at once
within and without experience: even though we don't hear the songs, we
know they are awful. 47
Extimacy, as the relation between love and experience, is reenacted in the 36
relation between the music and lyrics of the 69 Love Songs. Each song
musically represents a particular soundscape or combination of discernible
soundscapes, connected to a specific musical genre, history and place. And
yet, whether the listener happens to be boy or girl, the totality of these
soundscapes in the album produces for each a univocal statement about
love—which is not to say that oscillation between
the two alternative
positions is excluded; for one thing, oscillation between two positions
presupposes two distinct positions in the first place; for another, as Freud
argued, unconsciously we are all bisexual. 48
Recapitulating, while the dynamic songs could allow for a division of the 37
universe into the realms of experience and transcendence, thereby posing
love as the transcendental precondition of the empirical amorous affair, the
mathematic songs guarantee that this transcendental precondition be not
reduced to an exception to empirical life, an Ideal, but be instead posed on
the level of the real—something which, albeit unrepresentable, is the core
circumscribed by all empirical life and representation. The term aesthetic
anorexia designates that artistic approach that circumscribes the real as the
unrepresentable nothing.
Consisting of two sets of songs, the dynamic and the mathematic, the 69 38
Love Songs is an album that is itself sexed—which is why, to respond to our
initial question, for some listeners, the overall point of the album may be that
love is (real), and for others that it is not, that it is an impossible, perhaps
overrated, Ideal which, as such, we might as well discard.
It follows that, in more general terms, sex determines what appears real and 39
what illusory, or, as Lacan puts it, sex is 'a matter of the constitution of the
subject’s reality', a process that takes place by 'testing the external by the
internal.' 49 It is 'the judgment of existence, which consists in saying—This is
not my dream or my hallucination or my representation but an object.' 50
In other words, boys and girls, if your sex happens to be other than what you 40
expected, or changes each time you contemplate the album as a whole, this
does not indicate any confusion in your gender identity or sexual orientation.
If sex has any relation to whether you identify yourself as 'female', 'male',
'transsexual', 'boyfriendable' or ‘girlfriendable’, etc., this is only insofar as
your sex allows you to see that specific type(s) of sexual orientation and
practice as real, and hence, also the potential locus of love, be it an ideal or
real.
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